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THE "REST OF US" IN THE "POLICING THE POLICE" CONTROVERSY
(Comments upon The Courts, the Police, and the Rest of Us,
by Professor Herbert L. Packer)
RICHARD H. KUH*

To the two horns that constitute the dilemma on
which this Conference seems to be hung-The
Supreme Court and Tihe Police-Professor Packer
has added a third one: The Rest of Us. Although
that third force is, potentially, far more powerful
than either of the other two, I fear that Professor
Packer has not fully explored, or, perhaps fully
"exploited" its potential. Nor, in fact, have "the
rest of us." And that is what I shall try to do with
you.
The Packer paper centers on two areas. First,
Professor Packer examines the growing judicial restraints on police conduct, and the trend, clear
from the decisions of the Supreme Court, to substitute general restraints after some years of experience have shown that narrower rulings, limited to
particularly shocking facts, have not led to overall
changes of police methods. In making this point,
Professor Packer has focused, particularly, upon
interrogation. Second, he examines the growing
pressures for political restraints on police conduct;
the demands for the establishment of so-called
civilian review boards.
I shall deal with the first area only; particularly
with the importance to "the rest of us" of police
interrogation of suspects and arrestees, and what
"the rest of us" might be doing in order that, for
years to come, the police may be permitted, in the
public interest, to continue to question suspects
and persons under arrest in a fair, non-coercive
fashion.
I have the temerity to discuss this narrow but
vital topic with you despite the fact that the American Law Institute, as Professor Packer has pointed
out, is in the midst of its own major discussions of
its First Tentative Draft dealing with interrogation
and other topics. One learns from the press that the
District of Columbia's Judge Bazelon and others
believe that the Institute's draft goes too far in
permitting the interrogation of the unrepresented
* The author is a practicing attorney and the Coordinator, New York State Combined Council of Law
Enforcement Officials; a former Administrative Assistant to the New York County District Attorney; and a
Lecturer at New York University Law School.

defendant. Although I, personally, am delighted
with what the Institute has done, my own criticism
is that-if anything-it has not gone far enough.
Possibly my gluttony, as here expressed, may provide some added grist for the mills of the giants of
the Institute.
Professor Packer's advice of "calm down" is
soundly given. Calmness is desirable, but standing
alone, it may not be conducive to resourceful and
positive thinking. I have never been one to give the
advice, "When rape is inevitable, relax and enjoy
it".
And so--calmly, but not relaxedly-and fully
aware of judicially imposed limitations on police
existing in the year 1966, I should like to explore
with you some positive action that is available to
"the rest of us". The police and the courts are,
necessarily, pre-occupied with what I choose to regard as "patchwork" questions: the need or lack of
need for warning arrestees of their rights, and, if
the need exists, which rights; the question of
whether or not counsel is or is not to be present at
all interrogations; the question of how the right to
counsel may be waived, and how a judgment is
made of whether or not the waiver was "intelligently" made, or whether it is not to be binding;
and so on. While these questions are being argued
(and I do not minimize the importance and immediacy of reaching decisions concerning them), it
seems to me that now-almost two years after
Escobedo-"the rest of us" might be spending at
least some time on far more basic questions. More
than a century ago, Henry David Thoreau observed that "There are a thousand hacking at the
branches of evil to one who is striking at the root."'
It is past time, I believe, that we spent all of our
time hacking around, and time that we spent at
least some of it striking at the root.
What, then, are the roots? It seems to me that
there are two root questions at which we should be
laboring, and these I shall discuss with you. One is
a fact question; the other involves a plan of action.
The first question, the one of fact, involves the
1 WALDEN, EcoNomnr 98 (Crowell ed. 1961).
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ascertainment, beyond all valid claims of partisailship, of the significance of noncoercive interrogation to the administration of criminal justice in
America. The second, the plan-of-action question,
cannot rightly be reached until the first has been
fathomed. But before this audience I shall assume
(explaining, in a moment, the basis of my assumption) that a completely non-partisan survey would
demonstrate continued non-coercive interrogation
to be vital to the administration of criminal justice
as we wish it in America. On that assumption, the
plan-of-action question to be answered is how,
then, do we re-create the police right to question,
fairly and non-coercively, not just the poor defendant who has no attorney and the unwise defendant
who is quite willing to waive such rights as he has
and to answer questions, but also the wealthy defendant whose attorney is itching to get to his
side, and the hardened sophisticated defendant who
intends to keep his mouth shut at all costs, knowing he is within his rights in so doing?
First,as to the fact question, how do we go about
ascertaining, beyond all valid claims of partisanship,
the significance of non-coercive interrogation to the
administration of criminal justice in America?
Professor Packer cites a "study" announced by one
eminent New York State Supreme Court Justice,
Nathan R. Sobel (one of the about ninety justices
of like stature of that trial court, sitting in the City
of New York, and the only one to suggest as a
"fact" that interrogation is unimportant); he also
cites a New York Times story quoting Professor
Yale Kamisar referring to figures of the Detroit Police Department. Professor Packer terms these suggestions of the unimportance of interrogation "a
welcome beginning to the long and arduous process
of substituting facts for surmise and prejudice in
evaluating the role of confessions in the criminal
process". Had he chosen, Professor Packer might
have substituted quite different "facts for surmise
and prejudice". Less than three months before the
Time's story quoting Kamisar citing Detroit, that
same newspaper quoted New York County's nationally respected prosecutor, Frank S. Hogan, who
had observed that in ninety-one homicide cases,
confessions were to be offered in sixty-two (or 68%
of the cases), and that in twenty-five of the cases
(or 27%) the indictments could not have been obtained without the confessions.2 Seventeen prosecutors from major cities from coast-to-coast
amassed figures reflecting the importance of confessions; these figures, reported in the amicus curiae
2

N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1965, p. 1, col. 2.

brief of the National District Attorneys' Association submitted to the United States Supreme Court
some months ago for consideration in connection
with the pending interrogation cases, reflect studies
made in California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania. 3 Coincidentally they present a quite different picture of
Brooklyn, U.S.A. and of Detroit than those in
which Professor Packer places his trust.
There must, it should be obvious, be better ways,
however, of resolving this controversy than by
hollering "My experts and my figures can beat
your experts and your figures". Considering the
partisanship of the census-takers, neither the SobelKamisar-Detroit figures on the one hand, or the
prosecutors' figures on the other, although all were
compiled with unimpeachable integrity, are to be
fully trusted. The late Supreme Court Justice Felix
Frankfurter observed that "It makes a great deal
of difference whether you start with an answer or
with a problem. ' 4 And, obviously, each side in this
interrogation controversy-and even judges have
been known to take sides-has been eager to prove,
statistically and in every other way, how right it
is.
Two other ways exist, however, for ascertaining
the role of non-coercive interrogation in the administration of criminal justice. One involves the
focusing of ordinary common sense on the problem;
the other is to have a truly objective-and honestly
disinterested-survey conducted.
As to common sense: Conceding that lazy police
do exist, and that they sometimes prematurely stop
trying for other evidence once they have gotten a
confession, exhaustive police investigations are not
feasible in every case. In New York City, for example, with hundreds of thousands of crimes being
reported annually, the nation's largest local police
force of more than 27,000 men cannot devote optimal time to each inquiry. Shortcuts are needed.
Interrogation of suspects may save time-time
that really doesn't exist. Not every burglary can be
given the full Sherlock Holmes treatment, even
though the police might wish it were otherwise. The
only alternative to some shortcuts would be major
increases in police manpower. And were the manpower and finances available, would New York
3
Amnicus curiae brief of the National District Attorneys' Association, filed in the United States Supreme Court, in California v. Stewart and other cases;
sce particularly the forty-five page appendix reporthig on surveys.
4Some ReleZtions on the Readingi of Statutes, 47
CoLum. L. R.v. 527, 529 (1947).
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City be less of a police state if instead of 27,000
officers possessed of a limited right to interrogate,
that city's police were barred from questioning
suspects, but 54,000 of them-or 108,000 were in
view at all times roaming the city's streets?
Moreover, there are cases meriting the most exhaustive investigation, cases in which not a pebble
is left unturned, but cases that prove that sheer
thoroughness is no guaranty for the production of
substantial evidence. Despite uncompromising diligence, it is not rare for little critical evidence to be
turned up until the suspect is closely questioned.
Truman Capote's current best-selling non-fiction
novel, It Cold Blood, provides a vivid example.
Here was an unspeakably brutal crime--the quadruple murder of the entire Clutter family of Holcomb, Kansas-tirelessly investigated by dedicated, able, tenacious sheriffs and police, local and
state, officers working around the clock, but turning up practically nothing helpful until a tip from
an informer (please excuse the dirty word!) led to
the two suspects, Dick Hockock and Perry Smith.
Once located, skilful interrogation of each provided
the entire gruesome story, corroborated thereafter
in all its detail by further diligent investigation.
My own city of New York recently provided a
similar dramatic case: the double murder of two
young career girls, Janice Wylie (the niece of an
eminent writer) and her roommate, Emily Hoffert.
The girls' bodies were found bound together, nude,
and sadistically slashed, in their expensive apartment in a doorman-guarded fashionable building;
factors that served to terrify the inhabitants of our
nation's largest city, most of whom lived in surroundings seemingly far more vulnerable to intruders. All that the police could do, in a skilfully conducted investigation in which no seeming lead was
given short shrift, produced nothing. Ultimately,
through chance circumstances having little to do
with the basic investigation, two completely separate and unconnected defendants confessed!
The existence of the two confessions, one false
and the other valid, was to prove two things: both
the danger of interrogation that unfairly feeds a
suspect facts and then siphons them back again,
and the importance of confessions when the most
thorough inquiry produces little else. The first confession was from one George Whitmore, and was
the result of too eager inquiry; an inquiry that
produced a defendant who had "confessed", but
one whose confession was later proved to be spurious. The other confessions were from one Richard
Robles, who told his story in conversations with a

fellow dope addict unaware that his comrade
(another of those awful informers!) was wearing a
concealed tape recorder, serving as a police agent;
Robles then repeated his story on direct police
interrogation. After an afternoon's deliberations,
despite the confusion interjected by the factor of
the earlier arrest of the wrong man, a jury convicted Robles of murder in the first degree.
Even were confessions vital to only a handful of
cases, when they include tragedies such as that of
the Clutter family slaughter, and the equally senseless and brutal Wylie-Hoffert slaying, their use is
crucial if the public is to have confidence in the
law's ability to bring the guilty to the bar of justice.
Eighty-five years ago the great justice, Oliver
Wendell Holmes, then still a professor at the Harvard Law School, noted:
The first requirement of a sound body of
law is, that it should correspond with the acfeelings and demands of the community,
whether right or wrong. If people would gratify the passion of revenge outside the law, if
the law did not help them, the law has no
choice but to satisfy the craving itself, and
thus avoid the greater evil of private retribution.5
Consider, for a moment, the.community reaction
were some appellate court to hdk found the evidence against Smith and Hickock-almost all of
which was the fruit of their voluntary non-coerced
statements-inadmissible; or were an appellate
court so to rule with regard to the killer of Janice
Wylie and Emily Hoffert leaving as its remnant an
untriable charge. Faith in the police would not
thereby be diminished a jot; their work was the
epitome of diligence and beyond reproach in its
methods. But public confidence in the majesty of
criminal justice-in our courts and in our lawswould, because of the fantastic public alarm over
these two cases, be shaken to its foundations. Or,
if that seems too strong, at least it should be conceded that such a result would not strengthen already
sorely tried respect for law and order.
Even if Justice Sobel's figures were gospel, and
even if confessions were vital in only about ten
percent of the serious felony cases as he suggests,
having ten percent more-or ten percent less-of
our felons at large, rather than under supervision,
may be the difference between "the Rest of Us"
getting safely to our homes tonight, or one or two
5 HOTES, Tix
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of us being victims of crime en route. And I guarantee, as to that one or two, ten percent will seem
highly significant statistically.
Lawyers must be careful, however, of depending
too much upon ordinary common sense. It threatens to strip us of the incomprehensible mumbo
jumbo that produces clients who depend upon us
and who, in turn, we depend upon. I stated that
there were two methods for ascertaining the significance of non-coercive interrogation to the administration of criminal justice here in America, and that
common sense was one of them. The other, I suggested, was to have a truly objective survey conducted. With all the hundreds of thousands of
foundation and government dollars that are being
spent these days on what is known as "the crime
problem", I find it incomprehensible that some
dribbles have not been spent upon a dispassionate
survey concerning the significance of police interrogation. Objectivity could be assured by lodging
control in a board on which police, prosecutors,
civil libertarians, defense attorneys, and academicians were all represented. Trained statisticians
and researchers could be employed to do much of
the work; I am certain that I can pledge that the
nation's police and prosecutors would cooperate
fully in making their files and personnel available
for an objective study. Nor do I believe that such
a survey would be difficult or expensive to conduct.
A half dozen widely scattered cities in America,
large and small, from the four points of the compass might be selected. A date-any date-could
be picked. A half dozen or so serious crimes might
provide appropriate data: intentional homicide,
armed robbery, forcible rape, nighttime burglary of
a dwelling, arson, and assault with a dangerous
weapon might be a good sampling.
As to each case of each such crime, in each jurisdiction pending on the selected date, a careful inquiry would be made. What, in fact, was the evidence against the defendant? Did it include his own
statement? Under what conditions was that statement taken? Was its reliability established by any
corroborative evidence to which it led? Without the
statement, would the evidence have been sufficient,
within reasonable expectations, to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. What further inquiry
might reasonably have been made that was not
made and that might have turned up evidence dispensing with the need for the confession or its
fruits? Standards for making these judgments could
be promolgated. And to minimize subjective
weighting of these judgments, the field investiga-

tions might be conducted by teams of persons with
both prosecution and defense bias, if no single academician, trusted by both extremes, could be found.
In these days, when surveys form the basis of
business expenditures of millions of dollars, and of
political decisions to run or not to run, working out
the bugs should not be difficult.
So much for the fact question, one of the two
roots at which I suggested we must strike. Being
unable to await the results of such a survey before giving the balance of my talk here today,
before discussing my plan-of-action with you, I
must make assumptions as to its outcome.
Were a survey to demonstrate that interrogation
was not important, that it was, at best, a substitute
for lazy police work, that were the police, like Avis,
to try harder (within the realm of reason, that is),
ours might truly be an accusatory system, one not
dependent upon interrogation at all, then I should
be the first to say, "So be it!" It would then be
time to stop toying with the peripheral questions:
with advice of rights, and warnings, and waivers.
It would then be time that we banned all use of
interrogation, whether for evidence or for leads.
Frankly-and I -hope this will not surprise youI do not anticipate that result. And so I shall indulge the other assumption: that such a survey
would confirm that there is today no reasonable
substitute for non-coercive interrogation of suspects and defendants if evidence of guilt, sufficient
to convict the guilty, is to be forthcoming in most
serious cases in which police attention focuses upon
a seeming perpetrator.
What, then, is to be the plan-of-action to recreate the police right to question, fairly and noncoercively, all defendants, wealthy and poor, those
with attorneys and those without, the wise silent
ones and their foolish talkative brothers-in-crime?
If the right to question is necessary, and is to be
perpetuated, I am convinced that it must ultimately be that broad. To perpetuate anything less
would be to engage in a charade just this side of the
fraudulent. The American Law Institute, in its
admirable proposals concerning pre-arraignment
procedures, suggests that non-coercive interrogation is in order, providing that a defendant, fully
warned of his rights, waives his right to remain
'6
silent in "making a choice that he will cooperate."
But we-prosecutors, police, judges, professors,
defense attorneys, yes, and all "the rest of us"know that it is rare that a talking defendant (parSMODL CODE Or PR-AR o1mmNT Ploc uRE,
Comment at xxiii, 27 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966).
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ticularly one whose guilt is crystal clear to himself
and to God and to no one else) can do anything by
his responses other than to strengthen the case
against himself. Therefore, as is universally acknowledged, defense lawyers almost invariably will
insist that their clients say not a word.
To speak, then, in terms of voluntary waiver is
to engage in euphemism; what we are really discussing is a waiver by stupidity, or a waiver by reason
of poverty ( a waiver that follows from the lack of
counsel). Anatole France similarly commented that
"The law in its majestic equality forbids the rich
as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg
in the streets, and to steal bread"Y When it is only
likely to be the poor, the stupid, or the inadequately advised (those not advised by counsel
with loyalties running solely to the accused) who
exercise that "free choice" and talk with the
police, it is no real choice at all. Certainly it is not
one to be perpetuated interminably in a nation that
has developed a line of confession and guilty plea
cases designed to protect stupid defendants,8 and
at least a pair of landmark decisions intended to
protect their threadbare cousins.9
Some way must be found for truly treating all
alike, rather than accepting-calmly-inequal results, and salving our consciences with the claim
that it is "free choice" that self-inflicts any inequalities.
If non-coercive interrogation is vital to the
effective administration of criminal justice, then
what is needed is some method that will subject
all to it equally, compelling all defendants to
answer reasonable inquiries or to refuse to do so
at their own peril. Also to be needed, of course,
will be adequate safeguards against interrogation
methods that rile our sense of fairness or tend t,
produce untruthful confessions.
As the Constitution has been recently interpreted-and "the Constitution is what the judges
say it is"' 0-defendants cannot be compelled to
answer inquiries, reasonable or not, nor can they
be placed in peril for having failed to do so.
7 Quoted in VANDERBILT, LAW AND GOVERNMENT IN
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERIcAN WAY OF LIFE

16 (1952).
8 See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332
(1943); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957); Moore
v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957); Spano v. New York,
360 U.S. 315 (1959).
9 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
10Address, May 3, 1907, at Elmira, New York, by
New York State's then Governor, Charles Evans
Hughes, later Chief Justice of the United States.
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Whether or not the wording of the fifth amendment, and that provision's application to the
states, has previously seemed that lucid is irrelevant; the Supreme Court has now made this perfectly clear as a matter of constitutional doctrine,
and has done it so effectively as to preclude any
substantial possibility of back-tracking. Malloy
v. Hogan,"' Murphy v. Waterfront Cmmnissim of
New York Harbor,12 Escobedo v. Illinois,2 and
4
Griffin v. California1
are the cases that remove
this from the realm of purposeful argument.
The only means, then, of re-establishing a police
right to interrogate rich and poor alike, worldly
and naive, is by means of a constitutional amendment. Such an amendment would not repeal the
fifth amendment, but would create a carefully circumscribed exception to it in order to authorize
fair interrogation of all defendants, and to back-up
this authorization by creating some obligation to
respond thereto or to bear such peril as the law
might impose upon a suspect or a defendant for
his silence. Professor Packer's paper has observed
that the rules of criminal procedure have become
"constitutionalized". If they are proved to be in
need of further change, why not come directly to
grips with the difficulties by "constitutionalizing"
our revisions?
It is obvious that we will not amend the fifth
amendment today, nor in the next hundred days;
but let us begin a national colloquy concerning it.
Let us face clearly that, without revision, we must
either adopt a ban on all interrogation, or continue
for an indefinite time one that is inequitable in its
practical application. Candor compels this recognition. I recommend no specific amendatory language here and now. I am hopeful that some may
emerge after colloquy and full study. In urging
amendment, I am well aware that the privilege
against self-incrimination has become hallowed.
But I am also aware that Justice Holmes reminded
us that "It is one of the misfortunes of the law
that ideas become encysted in phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further
analysis". 5 I therefore urge the importance of
getting behind the tinsel and examining the idea
that lies beneath it. The privilege against selfincrimination, having been born in an age of torture and the Star Chamber, is no longer the only
11378 U.S. 1 (1964).
12378 U.S. 52 (1964).
1378 U.S. 478 (1964).
14380 U.S. 609 (1965).
IsHyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 391 (1912).
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method of forfending against unconscionable questioning in these days of closed-circuit television,
magic eye motion picture cameras, and teen-age
use of tape recorders. Taping statements has been
recommended by the American Law Institute.i
Moreover, the meaning of the privilege has been
gradually expanded; it now far exceeds its original
bounds. The 1965 ban-articulated by five of the
Justices in Griffin v. Californiail-upon a trial
judge's comment to the jury on a defendant's
failure to testify (comment then authorized under
California's constitution) is its most recent accretion. Concerning that development, Justice John
M. Harlan, concurring, commented:
... I am free to express the hope that the
Court will eventually return to constitutional paths which, until recently, it has followed throughout its history.
His associate, Justice Byron R. White, added:
I think that the Court in this case stretches
the concept of compulsion beyond all reasonable bounds....
I quote these disagreements, not by way of
quarreling with the Griffin decision, but to point
to the fifth amendment's heretofore one-way
stretch, and to suggest that sacrilege is not necessarily involved in-by constitutional amendmentrestoring it to something that may more closely
resemble its initial shape.
Now only do some other highly civilized countries lack the privilege against self-incrimination,
but this law school's immortal dean, John Henry
Wigmore, while favoring that it be retained to
prevent the browbeating of the innocent, urged
that we "not worship it blindly as a fetish", and
that it "be kept within limits the strictest possible"." A former Chief Judge of New York's highest appellate court and probably its greatest, Benjamin N. Cardozo, who later became a Supreme
Court Justice, said of the privilege:
This too might be lost, and justice still be
done. Indeed, today as in the past there are
26 MODEL
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§4.09(3).
'7380 U.S. 609 (1965).
18 8 WiGMoRE, EV iENcE §2251, pp. 317-18 (3d ed.
1940).

students of our penal system who look upon
the immunity as a mischief rather than a benefit, and who would limit its scope, or destroy
it altogether. No doubt there would remain
the need to give protection against torture,
physical or mental.... Justice, however,
would not perish if the accused were subject
to a duty to respond to orderly inquiry. 9
I fail to see what-other than tradition and an
existing provision in an amendable Constitutionis patently unreasonable in expecting us to be prepared to explain our actions, or to risk some consequences for not having done so. At least some
serious discussion of amendment seems in order.
And it should be possible to carry it on without
attack, direct or implied, upon the Supreme Court.
Just as it is the responsibility of Supreme Court
Justices to interpret the Constitution, it is the
responsibility of "the rest of us" to initiate revisions when we deem them appropriate.
We live in an age when crime is of burgeoning
concern, taking an increasing toll of life and of
safety. This is also an age when, increasingly, the
individual is called upon to yield personal rights
in the public good. Taxes of all kinds are exacted,
whether or not we are happy about paying them.
Mandatory military service is imposed upon our
youth, and death on the battlefield is risked, to
protect our democratic institutions in distant
lands. Businessmen are obliged to subordinate
their self-interests to the anti-trust laws, minimum
wage laws, food and drug laws, and hosts of other
proliferating regulations. Until 1957 and the
Mallory case, 0 non-coercive police interrogation
was taken for granted, even though we spoke of
ours as an accusatory system. Should we, by constitutional amendment, revert to reasonable questioning-and to the citizenry's obligation to respond thereto, who is to find it inconsistent with
our American way of life?
Having said this, let me concede that I may be
dead wrong. Most thinking persons may deem it
unreasonable to restore the right to question all
persons, non-coercively, those with counsel as well
as those without. But whether it is reasonable or
is not seems to me to be worthy of some debate.
This meeting, I am hopeful, may assist in sparking
such a dialogue.
Hopefully, concurrently with such a dialogue,
lawyers might try their hands at possible amenda19Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937).
20 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
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tory language, and possible narrow statutes that
such constitutional change would authorize. How
could the fifth amendment and our laws be modified to assure that questioning would be fairly
conducted, with no physical or psychological coercion other than the knowledge that the law required responses to reasonable inquiries? I can
make no firm recommendations, other than to
note some-not all-of the alternatives that
readily come to mind. Possibly questioning should
be conducted by or in the presence of some public
official, be he termed judge; commissioner, or the
newly popular "ombundsman". Possibly, as the
American Law Institute has suggested, statements
should be usable only if taped, or even filmed.
Perhaps responses to reasonable inquiries should
be mandated under penalty of some form of contempt. Or, it may be, that the penalty should
simply be the hazard of lawful comment to the
trial jury on a defendant's failure to respond. Possibly a declaration of a duty to respond to reasonable questioning might be bolstered by canons declaring it unethical for counsel to advise a suspect
or defendant not to answer. Fertile imaginations,
I am sure, will produce other means that might, by
constitutional amendment and legislative action,
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oblige responses by all to reasonable interrogation,
without endangering either reliability or fairplay.
A number of highly respected persons are presently deeply engaged in studies of our criminal procedures. Apart from the courts, the law school
faculties, and the leaders in legal thought of the
American Law Institute, there are the distinguished members of the President's Commission
on Law Enforcement and the Administration of
Justice, and those of the American Bar Association
Endowment's project who are so ably headed by
federal Judge J. Edward Lumbard. I am hopeful
that each of these bodies will not find the Constitution, as presently interpreted, to be the water's
edge at which their efforts must stop. Certainly a
field statistical study of interrogation under the
auspices of any such body would command national respect. And recommendations for constitutional amendment, were their propriety to be
indicated by such a study, coming from any one
of these bodies could not fail to create reverberations felt coast-to-coast. Such reverberations would
create some sympathetic, and some hostile, echoes.
But voluminous and intense discussion of constitutional amendment throughout the land is, I believe, precisely what is needed.

